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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PILLSBURY MILLS, INC.,
A Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.XEPHI PROCESSING PLANT, INC., A
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant,
and

Case No.
8723

LAFE .MORLEY and CALLIE MORLEY,
his wife,
Oross-( )omplainants and Respondents.
RRIFJF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff and respondent, Pillsbury Mills, lnc., A
Corporation, is a manufacturer and seller of turkey feedH
at Ogden, Utah. It will be called "Pillsbury." Defendant
and appellant, Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., A Corporation, was and is .a processor and buyer of turkeys at
Xephi, Juab County, Utah. It will be called ''Nephi.'~
Cross-complainants, intervenors and respondents, Lafe
Morley and Callie Morley, his wife, hereinafter called
''l\1orleys," are turkey growers of Millard County, Utah.
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This is a suit brought by Pillsbury against Nephi.
The theory of the suit was that Nephi had purchased
from Morleys some turkeys and was obligated to pay
those proceeds to Pillsbury under the terms of the chattel
Inortgage. It sought an accounting from Nephi as to the
proceeds and a judgment for any proceeds not turned
over to Pillsbury. ~Iorleys intervened and claimed offsets, and alleged Pillsbury was not entitled to any more
1noney. N" ephi contends it purchased s.aid turkeys on
~lorleys representation for Pillsbury and themselves of
the balance owing Pillsbury which it remitted. After it
developed said representations \Yere false, Morleys undertook and agreed to protect Nephi against the suit by Pillsbury and took or sent X ephi to ~Iorleys' attorney, who
assured X ephi that it would be protected, and in effect
need not follow the matter. :Jiorleys' attorney filed an
answer, confessing that X ephi held $2700.00 which belonged either to Pillsbury or to :Jlorley. In effect the
an.swer stated that Kephi was a stake holder. Thereafter,
Morleys' attorney signed a stipulation to the effect that
the court could enter judgment against X ephi. X ephi did
not enter into the stipulation and was not giYen any notice
thereof, or that the other parties were in effect asking for
entry of judgment .against it. Upon learning of the judgnlent against Nephi, it asked the trial court to Yacate said
judg1nent. 'l1 he trial court refused to Yacate said judglnent. This is an appeal fr01n the judg1nent entered
against Nephi, the refusal of the trial court to Yaeate
the judg1nent, .and grant a trial. It is predicated upon the
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theory that Nephi never authorized anyone to confess
judgment against it, and it was never given notice or
knew that Pillsbury and ~1:orley were in effect stipulating
for judgment against it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about January 20, 1953 Pillsbury and Morleys
entered into a turkey raiser financing .agreement; and to
secure performance thereof and payment to Pillsbury
by Morleys of a sum not to exceed $60,500.00 on or before
December 31, 1953, Morleys did on or about the 1st day of
April, 1953 execute and deliver a chattel mortgage to the
Pillsbury, a copy of which is attached to the Pillsbury's
complaint (R. 2 to 3).
Said mortgage w.as upon turkeys located on the farm
of Morleys near Delta, Millard County, Utah. It was filed
of record in Millard County, Utah; and there is no evidence herein of filing it in any other county. Among
other things it provided that in the event Morleys desired
to sell they would notify Pillsbury, and if written con.
sent were obtained:
"*** such sale will be made (by Morleys) for
the use and benefit of the mortgagee to the extent
of whatever obligations the mortgagors may owe
to the mortgagee, and further agree that the
moneys received from such sale to the extent of
such obligations shall be and belong to the mortgagee and be applied upon and by way of mortgagors' said obligations up to the full extent thereof, and shall be remitted by the buyer of such tur-
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keys directly to the mortgagee or its agent thereunto duly authorized without any right in mortgagors to receive any of the proceeds of such sale
except such surplus as there may be over and
above the amount of such obligations. Said mortgagors will direct the buyer to pay the proceeds of
such sale to the mortgagee to the extent of the obligation.s owed by said mortgagors to the mortgagee.***." (R. 2-3, Ex. A. compt.).
During 1953 Pillsbury sold ~Iorleys certain turkey
feeds; and in connection therewith made certain representations and warranties of the character of said feed (R.
7-11).
On or about November -±, 1953, ~Iorleys with consent
of Pillsbury sold their 1953 turkeys X ew York Dressed
to Nephi (defendant) at Xephi, rtah (Tr. 12-13; Ex. 2,
3, 4, 7, A). On or about the same day, Lafe ~Iorley told
M. L. Harmon, President-:Jlanager of defendant, Morleys
were indebted to Pillsbury in the sum of approximately
$41,000.00-$43,722.08; that he had 5000 toms to process
and market; that they would weigh approximately so
much; that he needed $4,000.00 for Ray Nielsen (for
labor) and he needed $3,000.00 for hilnself. ~-1 computation was 1nade of the esti1nated purchase price to be paid
by Nephi for said turkeys upon the repre.sentation by
Morleys and the 1nutual assu1nption of the average weight
of said turkeys to be detennined in fact as the basis of
the agreed purchase price. lTpon such esti1uate it appeared there would be sufficient 1noney to pay Pillsbury
Forty-three Thousand odd dollars ($43,722.08) and make
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the $7,000.00 advance payment to and for J\lforleys as
requested (Tr. 10-12, 30-31).
Pursuant to the above computed price Nephi did on
November 4, 1953 deliver to Ray Nielsen a check for
$4,000.00, and to Lafe Morley a check for $3,000.00 as a
part payrnent of the purchase price of said turkeys, subject to the later final determination of the correct total
sale price of said turkeys, according to the actual weight
after they \vere processed. After ;;aid purchase price was
detennined upon the actual processed weight of the birds
delivered and the .account between Nephi and Lafe Morley
was cast up as of November 4, 1953 the account showed
an advance overpayment on the agreed purchase price
of $3,887.25 (Tr. 10, 30-31).
Lafe Morley had also been a customer of Nephi
during 1952. At the end of 1952 he was indebted to
Nephi in the sum of $2,135.33 ( Tr. 10-11; Ex. 1). In 1953
he was again .a customer of Nephi, and on November
:.25, 1953, he was indebted to Nephi in the sum of $6,506.38
plus $20.88, which by credit of $514.60 was reduced to
$6,012.58 owing by Lafe :Morley to Nephi on February
1, 1954 (Ex. 1); and that on February 24, 1954 Lafe
:Morley signed a promissory note as of February 1, 1954
to Nephi in said sum of $6,012.58 (Tr. 9-12, 31, Ex. 1,
Ex. 2).
During all of 1954 said Lafe Morley, Ray Nielsen
and 11. L. Harmon were partners, dba M. & J. Co.
(R. 31).
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On January 14, 1954 Pillsbury's counsel by letter
notified Nephi that :Morley's indebtednes.s to Pillsbury
was $46,401.24 less $43,722.08 remitted by Nephi to Pillsbury, leaving a balance owing of $2,679.16 and requested
Nephi render Pillsbury a complete accounting (Ex. A,
Tr. 37-8).
On January 20, 1954: Xephi answereJ, which was in
part as follows :
"Nephi Processing Plant notified :Jir. Lee
Turner of Pillsbury Co., Ogden, Utah also Pillsbury Co.'s office at Los Angeles that they stand
ready and willing to pay to Pillsbury Co. for the
account of Lafe Morley $2,679.16 as soon as we
receive the authority frmn Lafe Morley to do so.
""\Ve do not feel that ·we should make a payment on the account of Lafe :Morley until we have
the authority from l\Ir. Morley in writing.
"It is n1y understanding that :Jir. :Jiorley is
Inaking smne kind of a clain1 against the Pillsbury Co. \Ve do not 'vant to be involved in any
controversy between these two parties but do have
to clear ourselves in this 1natter.
"The offer to clear this account will be terminated thirty days frmn date and the matter will
have to be worked out directlY with :Jir. Morlev."
A copy of said letter 1cas.sent to Lafe 1JI01·ley
(Ex. 7).
By letter dated February
. 11, 195± Pillsbury\~
. counsel
wrote Nephi again requesting the accounting and proceeds under the tenns of the 1nortgage; and anwnoother
b
things stated:
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"Any dispute that may exist between Pillsbury and Mr. Morley need not be of any concern
to you (Nephi Processing Company) as the same
will be settled by the parties themselves directly,
except as aid of the courts may be involved."
and advised that legal proceeding would be brought
against Nephi (Ex. B; Tr. 37).
Shortly after receipt of Exhibit B from the Pillsbury's
attorney, l\1. L. Harmon saw Lafe :Morley and had a conversation with hiin concerning the contents thereof, in
the defendant's office at Nephi. Mr. Harmon told Mr.
Morley that said letter had been received, and that it
claimed Nephi was indebted to Pillsbury about $2,700.00.
He also told J\1orley that he (Morley) was indebted to
Nephi; but in view of the fact Harmon, Morley (and
Nielsen) were going ahead with their turkey operation
in 1954, Harmon would endeavor to h.ave Nephi advance
enough money to pay Pillsbury the $2,700.00 if Morley so
directed. Morley said he had a claim against Pillsbury
much greater than $2,700.00 and it would be offset; and
that Morrley would protect the defendant from liability
herein (R. 31-2 Tr. 22-23).
Pillsbury brought this action against Nephi without
joining ~lorleys. On or .about :May 10, 1954 Nephi was
served with process herein ( Tr. 23). It was left with
M. L. Harmon. He forthwith contacted Lafe Morley and
advised Morley of said service. Lafe Morley advised
Nephi that Morley's attorney was Dwight L. King of
Salt Lake City, Utah; that all Harmon needed to do
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to protect Nephi herein was to go .and see said attorney
of said Morleys (Tr. 24-5; R. 32-3).
About :.May 15, 195-± Harmon took summons to attorney Dwight L. King. Harmon told Mr. King what
Mr. Morley had told l\Ir. Harmon. Mr. King told Mr.
Harmon there wa.s a greater sum owing :.Mr. :Jiorley
(by Pillsbury) so that he (Harmon) would not have to
be concerned about it; that he (King) would protect
Nephi in this suit and in the suit .against Pillsbury. At
that time Harmon told King that ~{orley was indebted
to Nephi in the sum of $6,012.58 for 1953 and prior years
operations. Harmon did not tell :Jir. King that Xephi had
$2,700.00 on hand which could be remitted to Pillsbury
(or any other sum). That was the only conversation
I-Iarmon had with ~Ir. King. After what :l\Ir. King told
him, 11r. Harmon didn't think Nephi would need to be
represented, and relied upon :Jir. K~ing to file an answer
on behalf of Nephi and the :Jlorleys (Tr. ~-1-6, 32-33).
Unknown in fact to X ephi, I\::ing filed a Motion for
Change of Yenue in the nan1e of Xephi (H. 3)~ but for
Morleys (Ex. 9, Tr. -15 ).
Eleven months passed by without any actiYity of
record in the case. No conununication or word passed
between Nephi and nlr. K_ing.
May 1G, 1955 nlr. 1'-ing filed herein ~Iorley"s crosscomplaint against Pillsbury, alleging a breach of said
turkey raising eontract and warranties, and prayed that
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the court order $2,700.00 in the hands of Nephi be paid
to l\!Iorleys, and I\lorleys have judgment against the plaintiff for $23,634.00 less any sum due and owing under the
1nortg.age involved herein; and for such other and further
relief as to the court may seem meet and equitable (R.
7-11). It was not served on Nephi. Pillsbury's answer
thereto was not served on defendant (R. 18-20). At the
same time Mr. King filed 1\iorleys Motion to Intervene
(R. 12). It was not served on Nephi; and no information
of or notice of any or all of these matters came to Nephi
until after entry of judgment, February 22, 1957 (Tr.
G-8; 25-6).
On .May 16, 1955 1\ir. l{ing filed .an answer in the
name of Nephi, and purportedly for Nephi, and therein
it was falsely stated that Nephi held in its hands approximately $2,700.00 from the sale price of J\1orleys 1953
turkeys. Said answer prayed that the court determine
to whom the funds in Nephi's hands belonged, and make
such orders .as are necessary to protect Nephi against
Pillsbury or J\tforleys for such payments should the court
require the Nephi to pay either, and for such further relief as to the court 1nay seern meet and equitable in th~
premises (R. 13-14). It was not a pleading to protect
Nephi; but was in the nature of an interpleader to help
Morleys. No authority was given by Nephi to file such
a pleading. It was repudiated when it became known
(R. 29-31).
The Secretary-Treasurer of Nephi, Mr. Steele, never
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knew prior to February 22, 1957 that Dwight L. King
purported to represent Nephi in the above cause. He
never saw a copy of the answer filed herein by Mr. King
in the name of Nephi until after February 21, 1957, when
a copy of said answer was brought to Kephi's office by
attorney Jensen. 1\Ir. Steele was the one who always
picked up Nephi's mail during 195-1 and 1955, and no
communication was received from D\vight L. King during
those years in relation to this case; and no .such record
was in the files of :Kephi (Tr. 3-7). ~Ir. King claims he
forwarded a copy of the answer filed in the name of
X ephi under date of ~lay 13, 1955 (R. 42), which ·was
never received by Nephi.
On November 13, 1956 the above cause '''as set to
be tried February 13, 1955 (R. 21). On January 23,
1957, written interrogatories were sub1nitted to the :Jforleys by Pillsbury and served upon ~Ir. King, as counsel
for the 1\Iorleys. On January :29, 1957, Pillsbury noticed
l\fr. King as :Morley's counsel, and purported!~~ as Xephi's
counsel, he would take the deposition of Lafe :Morley
(R. 24). No word was sent to or receiyed by Xephi of
any of the~e. (X o exmnination of Lafe :Jlorley was made
on behalf of Nephi).
On

I~..,ebruar:· 1:~.

1!l:l I,

~r r. I~ing,

as attorney for
the .:\lorle:·~ ~igned a stipulation that judgn1ent 1night
be entPred again~t ~ephi. It "·as filed February ~1,
19!>7. l\fr. King· did not P\"Pll purport to sign as attorney
for NPplt i (R. ~;) ). On February 18, 1957 judgnient was
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rendered and entered on February 21, 1957 in favor of
Pillsbury and against Nephi for $2,679.16 plus interest,
or for $3,181.38 (R. 27). On the sa1ne date judgment
w.as entered dismissing said cros.s-complaint on a written
stipulation dated February 19, 1957 between counsel for
Pillsbury and counsel for Morleys (R. 26).
On February :21, 1957 counsel for Pillsbury wrote
X ephi that judgment had been entered against it in thr.
above amounts and asked Nephi to pay same (Ex. 5, Tr.
27).
On February :22, 1957 Udell R. Jensen, counsel for
Nephi, called attorney King by phone. At that time :Mr.
King stated he didn't represent Nephi herein and that
the pleading he filed in Nephi's name was only as a
matter of courtesy or accommodation (Tr. 45-6; R. 52-3).
On February 25, 1957 at 7:30 p.m. (after judgment
had been entered) an envelope was mailed to Mr. Milton
Harmon, Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., Nephi, Utah, by
Dwight L. King. It contained .a letter which was dated
February 13, 1957 to "Dear Milton"; and stated that the
Pillsbury and Morleys had finally agreed, and the balance held from the sale of the Morley birds in 1953 could
be paid to the plaintiff (Ex. 6; Tr. 26-7).
The first information which came to Nephi after
Pillsbury's letters requesting .an accounting and payment
dated January 14, 1954 and February 11,1954 (Ex. A and
B) was Exhibit 5 dated February 21, 1957, after entry
of judgrnent (Tr. 25-7).
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On ~larch 12, 1957 counsel for defendant wrote Mr.
King, in part as follows :
"In view of your statement to me over the
phone on February 22, 1957, that you did not
represent the Nephi Processing Plant in the above
c.ase, will you please advise me on behalf of the
Nephi Processing Plant the following:
1. On whose state1nent, and on what facts did
you file the ~lotion for Change of Venue in

the above case, and also the Answer, both
of which purport to be filed on behalf of the
Nephi Processing Plant.
2. If you at the ti1ne believed you represented
the Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., a corporation, when did you first cmne to the view
that you no longer represented them in the
above case~
3. \Vhat noti('e or infonnation did you give to
the Nephi Processing Plant, or any of its
officers, that you did not represent said Processing Plant in said case f
.f. \:Vhat, if an:~, notice did you giYe to them, Or
anyone on their behalf, that you intended to
have the Judgment entered against them
dated February 1~. 1957." (Ex. 8, Tr. 45).
On :L\larch 15, 1!);)7, he

an~wered

in part as follows:

"* * * I never did discu~s the :Jiotion for
Change of Venue with an:~one representing X ephi
Proeessing Plant to In:~ recollection, that was
purely the di~eu~~ion between n1~~self and l\Ir.
Morley.
''2. In an::-;\H'r to question nu1nber two the

'
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question of representing Nephi Processing Plant,
Inc. other than for the purpose of protecting
:Morley's interest was never discussed with anyone. When .Mr. Harmon came into my office to
discuss this matter he had already talked to :Morley and 1Iorley had instructed him to come in
and had told hi1n that I was representing the
l\lorleys in their claim against Pillsbur)· l\1:ills.
The Answer which was filed represented my
understanding of the only interest which Nephi
Processing Plant Inc. had in the law suit, namely,
that of a stake holder .and were only concerned
about not having to pay twice on the same claim.
"3. I mn sure .Jlr. Harmon will recall that
no fee -was ever discussed with 1ne nor has there
ever been any tendered or received by 1ne for
the Answer which was filed disclaiming any interest in the money on the p,art of Nephi Processing
Plant, Inc.
".No notice was ever given to Nephi Processing Plant of my not representing said plant. I
never did represent them so it was not my thought
in the matter that I was not representing them."
(Ex. 9; Tr. 45).
A further letter was sent by attorney Jensen for the
defendant to attorney King on March 19, 1957 (Ex. 10;
Tr. -±5 ). March 27, 1957, attorney l(ing answered at
length stating his position and explaining his conduct.
11herein, among other things, he says :
"~fy only interest was in presenting for 1vforleys a claim against Pillsbury Mills, Inc., which
I have done and which I have settled satisfactory
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to my client, Lafe ~forley, and to my own satisfaction." (Ex. 11; Tr. 45).
On April 15, 1957 Nephi filed its ~lotion to Vacate
Judgment rendered February 18, 1957 challenging attorney King's authority to appear or plead for defendant herein; to strike the answer filed by him in defendant's name; and to pennit defendant to file its tendered
answer (actually filed 4-15-57, R. 46-48) to which was
attached the affidavits of ~I. L. Harmon and Edward
W. Clyde (R. 31-7). Said affidavit of ~Ir. Clyde state'S
he advised ::\[r. King that ~Ir. Clyde was not the attorney
for the defendant in the above cause or generally; that
notice should be given to either ::\Ir. John S. Boyden
or Udell R. Jen.sen (R. 33-6). Xo such notice was given,
or clai1ned to be given, by ::\Ir. King.
The accounting case between Lafe ~Iorley, Ray
Nielsen and :i\1. L. Hannon filed in Juab County, rtah
(Civil No. 3767) is referred to by ::\Ir. King (Ex. 9, R .
.J.l-45), in which ~Ir. Arthur Xielsen is counsel for ::\Iorley
and Nielson. In that case, ::\f r. Nielson has resisted the
inclusion therein of the further and supplemental answer
and defense of the facts of the judgn1ents entered in this
case. On pre-trial of that case in Juab County, which
l\1 r. l~ing refers to in his affidavit, the Hon. ::\Iaurice
Harding announced he was inclined to rule that the
1natters which could han' been litigated in this c.ase
(Civil No. 29182) could not be included in Civil No.
3767 (R. 51-53).
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On April 19, 1957 deinand was made on Dwight L.
1\:ing for the production of certain documents, at th8
time the motion to vacate the judgment was to be heard
(R. 37-8). Said docuinents were never produced; and
Dwight L. King never appeared in court on this matter.
His only stateinent in the case is his affidavit filed
herein after the hearing.
On June 13, 1957 the district court entered its order·
denying defendant's Inotion to vacate the judgment and
to strike pleading filed by :Mr. King in defendant's name
and to pennit filing of defendant's answer (R. 54).
On June :28, 1957 defendant filed its motion for rehearing or new trial, and attached an affidvait referring
to the documents or papers which the .Morleys and their
counsel had been asked to produce, asserting that Dwight
L. King advised defendant on April 20, 1957 that he
claimed to have written a letter to defendant, which
among other things read: "I do not think that it will be
necessary for you to appeal (appear) or take any action
at the time of trial." Therein is asserted lack of notice,
surprise and excuse for failure to produce documents
which would have established that the Morley defendants
knew that the substance of the answer of the defendant
was false; that the defendant and the court had been
imposed on; and that by ordinary diligence defendant
could not produce said documents at the hearing on the
motion herein (R. 84-5).
Defendant's motion for rehearing or new trial wa:::;
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denied by the trial court the 21st day of August, 1957
(R. 88).
Notice of appeal frorn denial of the Motion to Vacate
the Judgment, strike the pleading filed by attorney King
in defendant's narne, and to permit defendant to file its
answer herein was filed July 15, 1957 (R. 102).
Second Notice of Appeal from the ruling of the
court denying defendant's motion for rehearing or new
trial was filed September 10, 1957 (R. 111).
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The real dispute arose between Pillsbury and the
~Iorleys as to whether 1\Iorleys owed Pillsbury or Pillsbury owed l\Iorleys on their transaction. Without any
notice to or information received by X ephi, Pillsbury
and 1\Iorleys settled their differences between thmnselvea;
and they then stipulated \\ithout notice to Nephi judgrnent be entered in favor of Pillsbury and against Xephi
for the debt of :.Morleys.
The terms of the rnortgage betw·een Pillsbury and
:Morleys arnong other things provided that the rnortgagors (l\lorleys) would direct the buyer (Nephi) to
pa~r the proceeds of the sale to rnortgagee (Pillsbury)
to the extent of the obligation owed by said l\forleys to
Pillsbury. For thP purpose of giving that infonnation,
it appears Pillsbury had de.signated l\Iorleys .as its agent
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to advise Nephi as to what the mortgage debt was. Likewi'se it appears that l\1 orleys were selling as an agent
of Pillsbury. In both connections the representations of
the Morleys to the buyer bound Pillsbury.
The record.s of Nephi, the testimony of its presidentmanager and its secretary-treasurer all establish beyond
any question that the representations of the mortgagors
(~Iorley~) to K ephi as buyer were false. It was by inadvertance, or by intentional1nisrepresentation of :Morleys
and mistake or inadvertance, of Nephi that the figures
were relied on .and the 1noney paid to and for Morleys.
Pillsbury did not notify Nephi of the amount it claimed
until the second 1nonth after the sale of the turkeyc.
Under such circumstances, Pillsbury is not entitled to
recover from the purchaser, 10 Am. Jur., Sec. 192 p. 843.
Pillsbury may not pass its loss, if any, to Nephi, which
arose under and through Morleys while acting as an
agent of Pillsbury, 10 Am. J ur., Sec. 203 p. 850.
POINT I.
THIS IS AN ACTION TO RECOVER A DEBT OR FOR
THE ENFORCEMENT OF A RIGHT SECURED BY A MORTGAGE. THE LAW REQUIRES THE DEBTS BE DETERMINED THEREON AND OFFSETS ALLOWED; AND THE
JUDGMENT OR ORDER SHOULD BE VA.CATED AS THIS
WAS NOT DONE.

It is asserted by Pillsbury; and also asserted in the
affidavit of Dwight L. King that the settlement between
Pillsbury and Morleys had nothing to do with Nephi
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herein. Said position is not sustained by either the facto,
the pleadings, or the law.
Pillsbury attached to its cmnplaint a copy of the
chattel mortgage. It alleged it was filed in l\Ellard
County, Utah; that it is in full force and effect; that
the debt secured thereby is in an amount in excess of
$2700.00; and i.s now owing from Morleys (mortgagors)
to Pillsbury, and it is past due. Under ''Second" said
nwrtgage reads:
"This n1ortgage is given to secure the indebtedness of the mortgagors to the mortgagee created
and to be created under and by virtue of the terms
of one certain Turkey Raiser's Financing Agreement between the parties hereto dated January
20, 1953, and to secure the faithful performance
by the mortgagors of the terms of said agreement * * *."
The prayer of the con1plaint then asked that Nephi
be required to account; and upon said accounting, Nephi
be ordered to pay over .and deliver Pillsbury all proceeds
from the sale of said turkeys not theretofore delivered
to Pillsbur~,, and upon it8 failure so to do Pillsbury have
and recover judg1nent against X ephi for the amount
thereof, and for such other and further relief as 1nay be
proper.
l\forley~

part ple.ad

a~

in paragraph IY of their cross-cmnplaint, in
follows:

•'Thn t as part of the agree1nent between the
plaintiff and these cross cmnplainants, cross con1·
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plainants agree to purchase from the plaintiff
whole grain pellets and other necessary feeds for
the turkey poults. That all of the moneys advanced
by the plaintiff under the mortgage were used
by cross complainants for the purchase of feed
for turkeys, for the care and raising of said
turkey poults. "
Part of paragraph X of said cros.s-complaint read::;:
"That there remains due and owing on said
mortgage a sun1 Inuch less than the amount due
to these cross-complainants from the plaintiff as
a result of the breach, of implied and expressed
warranties of the plaintiff's whole grain pellets."
In part the prayer thereof reads:
"these cross c01nplainants have judgment
against the plaintiff for the sum of $23,634.00, less
any sum due and owing under that certain mortgage of ani1nate chattels dated the 1st day of
April, 1953."
Other .allegations of cross-complaint were that Pillsbury
breached the warranties that ordinarily go with the sal8
of feeds; and as heretofore pointed out, then asked that
the cross-complainants have judgment against Pillsbury
less any sum due and owing under said 1nortgage. What
could be plainer in a pleading as a request for an offset,
without calling it such, than the words of the crosscomplaint. There is no doubt that hy Morleys request
for relief, they tied the feeding contract and the mortgage
together, and that .all they did thereafter did not change
the legal effect of these proceedings as they relate to
Nephi.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

This case is an action brought by a mortgagee under
the terms of its mortgage. It appears our statute on
actions brought on mortgages governs this action.
'There can be but one action for the recovery
of .any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon* * *personal property,
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given
adjuding the mnount due with costs and disbursements * * *."
78-37-1 U. C. A. '53.
A situation not too unlike this one arose in a l-:-tah
case hereinafter referred to, except said action was
brought to foreclose .a 1nortgage, instead of recover the
proceeds from the sale of the mortgaged assets. Said
1nortgage was given to secure pay1nent for the construction of a building upon the property of the defendant.
The plaintiff's as.signor (an uncle of plaintiff) agreed
to build a house in a certain 1nanner; but did not perform
it in accordance with its tenus. The court in that case
held the dmnages arising under the building contract
were offset against the indebtedness under the 1nortgage,
even with the uwrtgage in the hands of an assignee.
Stevens v. Do:1~·cy, 58 F. 196; 198 P. :216.
Another lTtah ease of siu1ilar effect is one in which
but did
the IJlaintiff sought to foreclose a 1nort()'a()'e
b
b'
not ask for .any deficjenr~' judg1uent. In that case, it
was urged that then' could not be any offset bec.ause
there had been no request for a deficienc~T judg1nent.
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In that case, the court said:
"The request or absence of request for a
deficiency judgment does not determine whether
or not a defendant may urge any defense which
he otherwise nlight have. Foreclosure is statutory.
Foreclosure proceedings on a mortgage securing
a note in default rnust be conducted in accordance
with the statutes, Sec. 104-55-1 to 9, U. C. A. 1943.
It is necessary to have the court ascertain what
sum of rnoney, if any, is due and owing on the
note and mortgage * * *. If it is detennined that
the mortgage has received funds sufficient to
extinguish the mortgage indebtedness, and which
funds should have been so applied, the mortgagor
has a right to have such funds applied to the
payment of the rnortgage note as of the date when
they should have been so applied."
Stewart Livestock Co. v. Ostler et al, 105 U.
529 at p. 540-1; (144 P. 2d 276).
On Point I, we submit that this is .an action to enforce
a right secured by a mortgage, and the law requires that
the debt owing fron1 Morleys (mortgagors) to Pillsbury
be determined and offset allowed thereon. As this was
not done the judgment should be vacated and the trial
court directed to proceed to adjudicate the amounts
owing between the mortgagor .and mortgagee.
POINT II.
DEFENDANT WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL;
OR IF REPRESENTED, ITS COUNSEL HAD NO AUTHORITY TO PLEAD AS HE DID; AND DEFENDANT WAS
ABANDONED BY COUNSEL WITHOUT NOTICE OR
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KNOWLEDGE. JUDGMENT RENDERED AGAINST DEFENDANT WITHOUT NOTICE OR KNOWLEDGE IS WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IS TO BE VACATED.

The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that no
notice, letter or word was received from l\Ir. King, or
other persons, by Nephi, its officers or agents of either
or any of the following: (a) that ~Ir. King had filed
a l\Iotion to Change the Yenue, (b) that he had filed
an Answer in the nmne of the defendant, or (c) that he
had in Nephi's nmne pleaded Xephi held $2700.00 of
proceeds from the sale of l\Iorleys' 1953 turkeys. So
there was and cannot be any en1ployment by ratification,
or estoppel by knowledge and failure to act.
It is said there Inust be a contract of emplo-y1nent,
express or in1plied, between the attorney and the party
for wh01n he purports to act or some one authorized
to represent such party, 5 Aln. J ur. 278.
Our Supreine Court in .a case involving similar
questions quoted with approval an earlier case in part
as follows:
"Their appearance is pri1na facie evidence of
authority to act, but when such authority is denied, or properly put in issue. it is con1petent to
rebut by proofs any presun1ptions which Inay
arise fr01n such acts. If the .attornev was without
authority, then his acts could bind ~no one * * *.
It follo\~s, a8 a logical r~snlt of the propositions
before d1scussed, that a Jndginent rendered with-
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out service, or upon the unauthorized appearance
of an attorney is ( * * *) void."
Blyth & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345 at
354-5, 49 P. 1027.
Further it is held in said case that the judgment will
not stand, and the parties will not be left to their remedy
against the attorney. Same effect: Lowe v. Bank of
Vernal, 110 l~. 496; 175 P. 2d JS-!. Judgment in said case
was vacated by district court.
If in May, 1954 Dwight L. King was the attorney
for Nephi herein, he had the following duties: to faithfully, honestly and consistently represent the interests,
and protect the rights of his clients; and to discharge
tho.se duties with the strictest fidelity and the utmost
good faith. 5 Am. J ur., Sec. 46, p. 286.
Our standards of representation of a client state:

"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Within the meaning of this cannon, a lawyer reprents conflicting interests, when in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose."
Rule 6 of Professional Conduct of Utah State
Bar.
The answer filed in May, 1955 by .Mr. King in
Nephi's name was without authority, or in excess of
authority and purported to contain an .admission which
tended to create liability against Nephi. No written or
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oral authority appears on the record on which that type
of pleading was filed.
Even where there is no conflict of interest, counsel
has no implied authority to make admission of liability
against his client. Such authority must be expressly
granted.
In an action involving an admission by counsel for
appellant that the appellant was "liable" for the reasonable rental value of the lands, our rtah court held that
such an admis.sion was but a legal conclusion and was
not binding either upon the person upon whose behalf
it was purportedly made (appellant) nor upon the court.
Re: Iiansen's Estate, 53 U. 23, 184 P. 197, Syl. 3.
In relation to authority to confess a judgment against
his client, the following appears:
"At con1mon law a judgn1ent was confessed
pursuant either to a warrant of attorney or a
cognovit actione1n. And more recently the practice
is regulated by statutes, in s01ne states based upon
this c01nmon-law practice. The 1nanner in which
the authorit~· to confess judgn1ent is created,
whether at connnon law or under statute would
seem to negative any i1nplied authority on the
part of the attorney 1nerel~· fr01n the relation
of attorney and client."
B. C. Pr. and R., r ol. 1, Sec. 57. p. 66
While there is authorjty that a counsel for a party
has authority to confes.s judg1nent, it is limited. The following illustrates the limitation:
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"Moreover, a considerable number of decisions maintain the view that an attorney h.as no
implied authority to enter a consent decree or
confess judgment without the client's direction,
knowledge, or consent, and that where a judgment
or decree is entered against the prote.st of the
client or his instructions not to compromise, it
will be held not binding on the client, especially
when the judgment or decree is designated to
carry into effect an unauthorized compromise."
5Am. Jur. Sec. 101, p. 322-Attorneys at Law
The judg1nent .appears to be one entered upon an
unauthorized stipulation for confession of judgment, or
one on 1notion for summary judgment. Judgment by
confes.sion is authorized by 78-22-3 U.C.A. '53. Rul8
58A (e) provides "the party seeking the same must file
with the clerk * * * a statement verified by the defendant * * * concisely stating the claim and that the sum
confessed therefor is justly due or to become due;" and
authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum.
No verified statement was filed; and no specified sum
w.as pleaded.
Rule 56 (c) provides that a motion for summary
judgment shall be served at least 10 days before the
time fixed for the hearing. No such motion was served.
Surely the filing of an unverified answer in the
name of Nephi "that it now holds the sum of approximately $2700.00 which is a portion of the proceeds from
the .sale of turkeys delivered to it by Lafe ~lorley and
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Callie Morley'' is, to say the least, a careless and flagrant disregards of the facts and duties of counsel for
Nephi, if he were such. It is not only an abandonment of
Nephi and its interests; but was an aider of his Morley
clients interests. To contend Nephi held money for either
the Morleys or Pillsbury was to the interest of the
Morleys for interpleader or intervention, or both. It
was against the interests of Nephi.
It was then the duty of l\Ir. King to take steps to
terminate the apparent relationship which existed on
the record, to make a full disclosure of the record to
Nephi; and to inform Nephi that it should obtain independent legal advice. But on the contrary King says
he wrote a letter in ~Iay, 1955 to Nephi, which was never
received, and the copy of which was never produced by
Mr. King; but he advised of its contents, part of which
were:
"I do not think that it will be necessary for
you to .appeal (appear) or take any action at the
time of the trial." (R. 84-5).
The same or similar language was used by another
counsel who wrote his client and prepared an answer
for a defendant where there was conflicting interests,
believing he was doing right. But the court held defendant was deprived of a fair trial essential to due process
and defendant was entitled to a new trial. Hammett v.
Mcintyre, 249 P. 2d 885, Cal.
J n part l\[r. l{ing

atte~npts

to clailn notice was given
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Xephi in Fe!Jnuu~·, 1U;)7 just before judgment, by calling
attorne~· l~d Clyde and .advising him of the proposed
settlement. The affidavit of .Mr. Clyde shows that the
information given to him was not given h~· him to Nephi
and also that he was not the attorney for Nephi in thi3
case or generally, and that he so advised .Mr. King.
"The relationship in a particular case cannot
be established h~· the fad that it exists in some
other case or has existed at some remote time,
even though the subject matter of the two cases
bears some relation to the other.
;)Am . .Jwr. Sec. 29, z). 279.
"In our opinion, it would be a dangerous precedent to hold that the relationship of attorney
and client in a particular case can be established
by the fact that such relationship exists in some
other ('a~e, even though the subject matter of the
two cases ma~· bear .smne apparent relation to
each other * * *."
Sandall t:. Sandall, 57 {'. 150 at p. 161193 P.
1093.
.
On Point II defendant submits the judgment and
order were entered without representation hy counsel;
or after abandonment by counsel, and without authority
notice or information to N ephj, and should be vacated.
POINT III.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF DEFENDANT AND
CROSS-COMPLAINANTS MAKE THE PLEADING FILED
HEREIN IN THE NAME OF DEFENDANT IN 195'4 AND
THE ONE FILED IN 1955 OF NO EFFE.CT.
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The conflicting interests of l\1orleys and Nephi 1nake
the answer filed by Dwight L. King in 1955 in Nephi's
name a filing without any authority of Nephi, of no force
and effect, and void .as pleading of Nephi.
The law upon this question of the effect of such
conflict of intere.sts is quite clear. In a matter in Califonia
involving an incompetent and a guardianship, the court
said:
"An attorney has a constant and perpetual
rendezvous with ethics. He stands as a trustee
for his clients interests-a most sacred and confidential relationship. It is elementary that a conflict of interests between a trustee and his beneficiary is never permiss.able. As a trustee cannot
maintain an attitude adverse to his beneficiary,
so an attorney may not represent claims inconsistent with those of his clients, or conflicting
claims of two clients. He cannot serve two
masters."
McClure v. Dononw, 186 P. 2d 718.
Our Utah Law is not without good examples of
what this type of conflicting interests does in relation
to the rights of clients. One of the early cases that appeared before our court was one in which an attorney
held a pr01nissory note for one client; and thereafter
for another client he had obtained judg1nent against the
same persons for wh01n he held the note: and thereafter
through legal proceedings eansed the note to be levied
upon and sold. Thus conflirt arose as to the o\vnership
of the not<' and the certifieates of stock that may have
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pa~~ed

under the uwrtgage or a deed. ln that case our
court struck down the proceedings under which the note
wa~ levied on, .and among other things said, therein referring to an earlier case in Utah and quoting it:
"It is a well settled general rule that an attorney cannot represent conflicting interests. For
uwre cogent reasons an attorney 1nay not, hy a
contract of e1nployment with his client, place himself in a position where his own interests are in
conflict with those of his client. rrhe relation of
attorney and eli en t is one of trust and confidence
requiring the attorney to use all the care, skill,
and diligence at his command to serve his client
alone without any obligation to serve a master
whose interests 1na~, be adverse to those of his
client, and without any temptation to serve his
own interests at the expense of the interests of
his client. The rule that an attorney may not by
his contract of employ1nent place himself in a
position where his own intere.sts or the interests
of another, whmn he represents, conflicts with the
interests of his dient, is founded upon principles
of public policy * * *

''In cases where applicable the rule has been
rigidly adhered to by the courts * * *"

Malia State Hank Com'r, et al v. Giles et al,
100 l T. 3fi~, at p. 571; 11-t P. 2d 208.
The above quotation is from Oillette v. Neu·.
house Realty Com JHlny, 7:-J F. 13, 282 P.
776, 779.
In Gillette vs. N eu-Jw1tse Really ComJmny ,<,'?t]Jra, ou1
court struck down the claim of a lawy<'r to recover for
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his services in which the only conflicting interest wa~
that he was to recover as his fee 10o/o from one client
which said client as a joint defendant might have the
other joint defendant pay in satisfaction of claims against
them both. In other words, counsel represented the hotel
company sued jointly with an elevator company for
damages resulting from the fall of an elevator. He was
to get as his fee 10o/o of the amount which the elevator
company would have to pay on this judgment.
In our case, it would be a travesty on justice to
permit counsel who purportedly appears for Nephi to
say that Nephi had money in its hands, which all the
evidence shows to be untrue ; and then for another party,
Morleys, who actually owed Nephi, to obtain money from
Pillsbury which should have paid l\Iorleys' debt; and
assist Pillsbury to get judgment against Nephi who
never did have an opportunity to appear and defend.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO VACATE THE
JUDGMENT IN THAT IT IS EQUITABLE AND FAIR THAT
DEFENDANT BE GIVEN NOTICE; THAT IT BE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL; AND THAT IT HAVE ITS DAY IN
COURT, WHERE IT HAS A l\IERITORIOUS DEFENSE.

The record in this ease shows that the motion of
l\Iorleys to intervene was not served upon Nephi (R. 12).
It shows the cross-cmnplaint of l\lorleys was not served
upon Nephi (R. 11). Pillsbury's answer to the crosscomplaint wa~ not served on Nephi (R. 20). No notice
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wa~

given to X ephi of the trial setting of the above
c.ause (R. 21). No notic·e was given defendant of the
continuance of the trial of February 13, 1957, if any
occurred. The stipulation of attorney King purports to
stipulate judgment again~t K ephi without its knowledge
or approval. It was not served upon Nephi (R. :25). The
stipulation for dismissal entered into hy Pillsbury's and
.:\[orleys' counsel was not served upon X ephi (R. 26).
All pleadings and actions by the court mentioned in
this p.aragraph affected X ephi, and substantially contributed to the court entering judgment against Nephi.
"Rule No. 5 (a) of Civil Procedure in part
provides "''' * * every pleading susequent to the
original con1plaint * * * every written rnotion
other than one which rnay be heard ex parte and
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer
of judgment * * * and other paper requiring
service shall be served upon e.ach of the parties
affected thereby * * * ."
Of the above rule, it is said:
"Rule 5 is simple, clear and effective. It requires notice to every party affected, of every step
in the acbon. The notice rrmst be given by the
service of the ple.adings, notices and papers in
the rnanner provided h~, subdivision (b) and (c)."
Fed. Pra. and Pro. Rules Ed. Y ol. 1, Sec. 202,
p. 357, Barron & Haltzoff.
"A judgment is irregular where its rendition
is contrary to the course and practice of the
courts-that i~, whPre proper rules of practice
have not been followed or where some nec·e~:-;ar~'
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act has been omitted or has been done in an
improper manner. There .are even cases in which
a departure from the established modes of procedure have been held to render the judgment
void."
31.Am. Jur. Judg. Sec. 402, p. 67.
'rhe failure of Pillsbury and Morleys to follow the
established Civil Rules of Procedure were a substantial
part of the causes of Nephi not having its day in court.
"Notice and opportunity to be heard are essentials to validity of judgment, without which
judgment is denial of due process, and not entitled to respect of other courts."
Morley et al. v. Morley et al. (Wash.) 1924,

230 P. 645.
By lack of notice, lack of representation by counsel
and receipt of no information, Nephi did not have its
day in court.
"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law that
a party to be affected by a personal judgment
must have a day in court, or an opportunity to
be heard.''
31.Am. Jur. Sec. 411, p. 7-!.
The tendered .answer of Nephi sets out 1neritorious
defenses. Nephi's 1neritorious defenses are:
1. The

uwrtgage debt n1ust be determined
.against the n1ortgagors, before Nephi can be
liable thereon.
2. Nephi is not indebted to Pillsburv. It did not
have on hand anY nwnevs fr01n ;ale of mortgaged turkeys.
paid the full sale price and
more.

It
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3. X ephi was entitled to purchase the turkeys
from :Jlorley~ as agents of Pi!Jsbury; and to
rely upon their representations as to amount
OWing.

+.

Settlernent between Pillsbury and the 1\Iorleys discharged the n1ortgage as to Nephi.

In support of the discharge of the debt ("-l:" above)
we find the following:
"The general rule is that where mutual debts
between two persons are reciprocally extinguished
by agreement, a mortgage securing one of them
falls with the extinguished of the debt secured."
36 Am. Jttr. Mortgages, Sec. +~S, p. 902.
In the few instances of suits to enforce chattel rnortgages the view has been taken the facts and circumstances
asserted were rneritorious defenses, and justified the
vacating of th judgment. 17 ± ALR 163.
On Point Y, we submit that the personal judgment
against Nephi dated February 18, 1957 and entered
February :.n, 19;)7; and the Order of Dismissal of the
cross-complaint as jt affects Nephi adversely, by letting
said _Morley~ out of this action, in equity should both be
vacated and set aside; and the tendered answer of the
defendant be permitted to be filed and the cause set
down for trial.
POINT V.
RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED UPON, INADVERTENCE, SURPRISE, OR EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; OR OTHER JUST REASON; AND IT WAS
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AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT NOT
TO VACATE ITS JUDGMENT AND ORDER UNDER FACTS
HEREIN.

Our Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60 (b) in part
provides:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the furtherance of justice, relieve
a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceedings, for the following
reasons:
( 1) * * *, inadvertance, sup rise or excuseable

neglect;
(2) * * *
(3) fraud whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) * * *
(5) the judgment is void; or
(6) * • *
(7) any other reason justfiying relief from the
operation of the judgment. The rnotion shall
be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1) or (3), not n1ore than three
months after the judgn1ent, order, or proceeding was entered or taken."
In November, 1953 Nephi relied upon the misrepresentation of l\1orleys that they only owed Pillsbury approxirnately $43,000.00 and were entitled as surplus over
the rnortgage debt to $7,000.00 on the estimated pounds
of turkeys sold to defendant, whirh defendant paid to
and for the1n. Late in N oven1ber 1953 Lafe ::1\forley was
infonned of overpay1nent by Nephi to ~Iorleys. In Febru-
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ary, 195-1 Lafe .l\Iorley recognized the overpayment had
been Inade \vhen he signed a note to Nephi promising to
p.ay it $6,012.58.
For over twenty months following .JI ay, 1955 .Morleys
by pleadings in the above action filed by their attorney
Dwight L. K.ing, misrepresented that X ephi had on hand
approximately $:2700.00 of receipts frmn sale of l\Iorleys
1953 turkeys.
It was a surprise to X ephi's officers to learn near
the end of February, 19;)7 that in .May, 1954 a motion
to change the venue of the cause had been filed in Nephi's
nmne; and that a year later an answer had been filed
in its nam.e stating it held approximately $:2700.00, which
was false. It was a surprise to Nephi to find on or after
February 22, 1957 that judginent had been entered in
favor of Pillsbury and against K ephi. For three years
last past it had relied upon the assurance of 1\Iorleys and
for over thirty-one Inonths upon attorney King, that it
would be protected frmn the clai1n of Pillsbury against
X ephi, and Pillsbury's daim would be offset on .Morley's
bill .against Pills bury herein.
Surely it is excuseable for the manager-president
of Nephi to be lulled into a false sense of security, when
for over 31 months after l\lay, 1954, he had no word
and no information that the above action was proceeding
against Nephi; and during said time never le.arned Pill~
bury and Morleys were contemplating having judgment
entered herein against Nephi, and to make their own
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settlmnent between them and not recognize an offset.
(By the stipulated settlement Morleys obtained more
money from Pillsbury than the judgment of Pillsbury
against Nephi).

This court has granted relief from failure of our
trial courts to vacate default judgments and other judgments within the provisions of U.R.C.P. 60 (b). In
Commercial Bank Trumbo, 17 U. 198, 53 P. 1033; Cutler
v. Haycock, 32 U. 354, 90 P. 897; and Cannon v. Tuft,
3. U. 2d 410; 285 P.2d 843 it did so. None were more
meritorious than this case on appeal.
In a Utah case in which the lower court was su:-.;tained, this court recently .approved the following rule
as the basis of relief from such judgment:
"We are entirely in accord with the authorities cited by plaintiff to the effect that it is generally regarded an abuse of discretion for a trial
court to refuse to vacate a default judgn1ent where
timely application is made and there is any reasonable grounds for doing so to the end that cases
may be decided on their 1nerits."
Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 U. 2d 415; 303 P.2d
995.
In Utah Commercial Bank v. T'l·u1nbo, supra, our
Supreme Court held that where the defendant "·as served
and he had his wife submit the cause to a certain firm of
attorneys; and then he left the state on business relying
they would care for his case: and their letters to him
and their notice of withdrawal fr01n his cause did not
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reach hiru; it wa~ an abuse of discretion for the trial
court not to vacate the judgment, when he made timely
.application.
In Cutler v. llaycock) supra, the Supreme Court
holds that the mere fact the appellate court thinks the
lower court should have granted the motion is not the
test in all cases for reversing the judgment, but it raises
a seriou.s doubt, and in such case a reasonable doubt i.;;;
.always resolved in favor of granting a trial upon the
merits.
\Ve submit laymen are entitled to rely upon their
partners representations and upon a partners counSl'l
where no notice, fact or inforrnation cornes to their attention that such reliance is not well placed; and accordingly
it was an abu.se of discretion for the trial judge not to
vacate the judgment and give ~ eph i an opportunity to be
heard on the merits.
POINT VI.
JUDGMENT SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE OF
PROCEEDING CONTRARY TO U.R.C.P., FOR LACK OF
TRIAL; FAILURE TO ENTER FINDINGS; AND FAILURE
TO DISPOSE OF MATERIAL ISSUES.

U.R.C.P. 5 (a), in part :quoted above was not followed.
Rule 6 (d) and 7 (b) required motions shall be made
in writing, and noti(•(• of hearing thereon shall be served
not later than ;) days before the hearing. No notice of
motion was given Nephi.
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Rule 12 (d) provides a motion for judgment on the
pleadings shall be determined before the trial on the application of any party unless the court order that the
hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the
trial. If additional matters are considered, the motion
shall be considered as one for summary judgment; and
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56. No motion was served on, or notice given Nephi of
request for the judgment.
S.aid Rule 56 (c) provides that a motion for summary
judgment shall be served at least ten days before the time
fixed for the hearing. No such motion or notice wag
given.
The judgment entered February :21, 1957 recites the
matter ca1ne on regularly for trial on a different date
than that set by the court, upon the pleadings reciting an
admission of liability, .and the stipulations of other parties than Nephi against whom the judgment was entered.
But there is no minute of any trial. No record appears
in the judgment of who appeared, who n1oved the court
for the judg1nent, or who was and who was not represented. No findings of fact or conclusions were made
or entered herein.
If pleadings filed in Nephi ·s nan1e are of any effect,
then the 1naterial issues tPndered by the pleadings not
disposed are: (a) Pillsbury·s c01uplaint alleged its de-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39

mand for an accounting hy Nephi for turkey proceeds.
Onl:~ an approximate amount was given in Nephi'~
answer. It was not determined what if any amount was
received to which Pillsbury was entitled; nor to whom
the smne \Vas due. The accounting would show no sum
on hand. (b) There was no adjudication of the arnount
due and owing under the mortgage. (c) No amount was
determined as owing frmn the mortgagee to the mortgagor .as a neces~ary condition before liability could fall
upon Kephi. (d) Answer tendered issue there was no sum
o\ving fron1 the 1\forleys to Pillsbury, and Nephi was entitled to have same tried. (e) Prayer was made for an
order to protect Nephi; and whether or not Nephi was
entitled to that order was not adjudicated. (f) Nephi and
Morleys prayed for equity, .and no determination of the
equities between the parties was made. (g) Morley tendered issue that there remained due and owing on the
mortgage a sum less than the amount which Pillsbury
owed ~Lorleys; and prayed for judgrnent against Pillsbury in a sum certain less any sun1 due .and owing under
the said rnortgage. Nephi was ver:· much interested in
those issues, and was entitled to have them adjudicated.
·•A judgment without trial and determination
of all the issues properly raised is erroneous. It
is a general rule that the ***, findings, and judgment must be as broad as the i~~lH'~ and must respond to all issues of both law and fact, *** ."
33 C.J., See. 8-1 ,p. 1135-6.
"In view of the fact that the is~me was neither
raised nor tried, in fairnes~ it should he sent back
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for a new trial so that the parties will have a full
opportunity to marshall and present whatever
evidence they may be able to find relating to this
issue."

Fretz v. Anderson, 5 U.2d 290 at p. 302; 300
P.2d 642.

"No specified finding was made by the trial
court on this matter; ***. Since the judgment \vas
rendered on the basis of outstanding drafts, rather
than the checks whose payment was wrongfully
inddced by appellants, this case must be reversed
and remanded for further proceedings."
Farmers & Jlerch. Bank v. Universal C.l.T.
Cr. Corp., 4l7.2d 155 at p. 160-1; 289 P. 2d
1045.
On Point YI, defendant submits that judgment
should be vacated because of proceeding contrary to Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of trial, for failure to
enter findings, and for failure to dispose of material
issues.
POINT VII.
VACATION OF THE JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANT DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1957; AND V A.CATION OF THE
ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 21, 1957 OF DISMISSAL OF
MORLEYS' CROSS-COMPLAINT SHOULD BE MADE AS
DEFENDANT'S ·CLAIM AGAINST MORLEYS MAY BE RES
ADJUDICATA AND DEFENDANT WILl. HAVE BORN A
SUBSTANTIAL LOSS WITHOUT A REME:oy UNLESS VACATED.

ln defendant's motion for vacation of the judg1nent
herein, one reason assigned was, that unless relief was
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granted to defendant against the Morleys herein its claim
against Morleys would probably be res adjudicata and
defendant have no relief (R. 30). In defendant's tendered
answer filed with its said n1otion defendant pleaded that
if for any reason the offset of l\Iorleys' clain1 against
plaintiff herein w.as not made herein, that in fairness defendant is entitled to file a proper claim herein against
the ~Iorleys and to be heard thereon (R. 48). To grant
that relief, and to do equity Morleys should not be dismissed as parties hereto and the order dismissing them
should be vacated.
The affidavit of Dwight L. King urges the court to
disregard this p.art of the record as another action of accounting is pending between Lafe ::Morley, Ray Nielsen
and ~L L. Harnwn and says he is informed this matter
is a part thereof. Defendant never knew or had reason
to believe this issue would ever arise ; and the issues
therein were joined before judgment herein was entered.
But when it appeared the trial court in the .above cause
likely would not grant relief to defendant herein, a supplemental pleading was filed in the accounting case on
this judgment. Prornpt objection was made therein that
the supplemental issue tendered was no part of the accounting case, but should be settled herein; .and the trial
judge on pre-trial indicated he regarded the matter as
re.s adjudicata so far as that case was concerned (R. 51,
53). Fnless relief is granted herein Nephi has wrongfully
been imposed upon, has sustained substanial loss; and
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likely will never have an opportunity to have its day .in
court thereon.
"Generally a judgment in favor of plaintiff
is adjudication, not merely as to existence of
plaintiff's cause of action, but as to non-existence
of any defense thereto."
Todaro v. Gardner, 3 U.2d 404; 385 P.2d 839.
On Point VII, it is submitted that both the judgment
in favor of Pillsbury and against Nephi and order of disInissal of the cross-complaint of the Morleys should be
vacated and set aside; and Nephi permitted to plead
against said Morleys herein.
CONCLUSIONS
1. This was an action for the recovery of a debt or
the enforcement of a right secured by a mortgage upon
personal property. In absence of a stipulation by all parties, the court should have determined the issues raised
by the pleadings and adjudged the amount due if any.
This was not done.
2. Mere conversation of l\Ir. Harn1on with :Mr. King,
and the latter's filing two papers in the nan1e of Nephi
did not constitute his emploYJnent. The presumption that
Dwight L. King was attorney for Nephi by filing of said
pleadings herein, was overcmne by a denial of such employment by Nephi; repudiation by Nephi of the pleadings filed by attorney King in Nephi's name; and the express assertion by said attorney that he did not represent Nephi herein and his only interest herein was in the
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cross-complainants, Lafe Morley and Callie Morley.
Where judgrnent and order were entered without notice
to defendant or knowledge by defendant of the likelihood
thereof, and contrary assurances were given, the judgment is of no force and effect and should be vacated.
3. The interests of Nephi and Morleys conflicted.
vVhen Dwight L. King determined he was going to plead
in Nephi's name it held nwney for Pillsbury on a mortgage debt of the 11orleys, or for the Morleys if the mortgage were satisfied, and he did not obtain such information fron1 the defendant's records or its officers, and he
plead for Morleys such money was held by Nephi, that
was a conflict of interest. He then had a duty to fully advise t.he parties thereof. He did not do so. King's duty
was to advise Nephi he intended to sign a stipulation that
Pillsbury could have a judgment against Nephi, and dismiss the case .as to the lVIorleys. His interest for :.Morleys
was otherwise. Accordingly the pleadings filed herein
in Nephi's name by Dwight L. 1\::ing are not binding on
Nephi.
4. Lack of notice to Nephi, failure of Pillsbury and
Morleys to serve their pleadings on Nephi, and failure of
Nephi to receive any information as to the progress of
the case, having been assured it would be protected, substantially contributed to the error of the trial court entering judgment against Nephi and dismissing cause as to
Morleys. Thereby Nephi did not have its day in court
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and Nephi is in justice entitled to the opportunity to
plead and be heard.
5. The misrepresentation of facts to the defendant
in November, 1953 by Morleys; and the reliance of defendant upon the same and statements of Morley and
l(ing that Nephi need not be concerned-it would be protected-are just and legal reasons why the judgment and
order should be vacated. Failure of the trial judge t 1
vacate the same was an abuse of discretion. Said judgment and orders should be vacated, Nephi permitted to
file its answer, and be gjven its day in court.
6. The U. R. C. Pr. 5, 6, 12, and 56 (c) were not
followed, and are applicable. If the pleadings in Nephi's
name are of any force or effect against Nephi, then the
following issues in the pleadings were not adjudicated:
(a) issues on accounting for funds claimed to be in
Nephi's hands and in which Pillsbury and :Jiorley~
claimed an interest; (b) the amount due on the mortgage
debt; (c) issue on complaint and cross-complaint of what
amount wa.s owing Pillsbury by 1\forleys, and the amount
less than said amount to which Morleys were entitled
to judgment against Pillsbury; (e) what orders Nephi
was entitled to have entered against Pillsbury and Moi'leys for its protection; and (f) the equities between the
parties.
7. The judg1nent and order herein should be vacated
so the clain1 of Nephi against the Morleys will not be res
adjudicata for failure of the same to be determined here-
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in; .and to save an innocent party from paying the debt
of another without recourse; and to prevent an unju~t
enrichment of the Morleys herein.
Respectfully sub1nitted this 8th day of January, 1958.
UDELL R. JENSEN
Of JENSEN & JENSEN, Lawyers
Attorney for Defendant
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